نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی‌دکتری، گروه حسابداری، واحد تبریز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تبریز، ایران.
2 دانشیار، گروه حسابداری، واحد تبریز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تبریز، ایران
3 استادیار، گروه حسابداری، واحد تبریز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تبریز، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The purpose of this study is to provide a model for measuring the moral hazard of managers based on financial data in firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. For this purpose, based on the literature, theories and surveys, 22 variables are extracted as sources of management moral hazards and they are and re-exposed to the comments of experts in order to rate the variables in terms of importance. 9 variables are selected based on expert preferences. Then appropriate coefficients are assigned to each variable using the group Analytical Hierarchy process (GAHP) to obtain the initial model. Finally, the obtained model is validated through the identified consequences. The information of the final model, which includes the variables of ownership structure, environmental uncertainty, monopoly in the product market, financial constraints, leverage ratio, free cash flows, capital expenditures, internal risk of the company and life cycle of the company, is collected from Tehran Stock Exchange. Results from the model validation test show that management moral hazards has a positive and significant relationship to information asymmetry and stock prices crash risk and a negative and significant relationship to investment efficiency. As a result, the proposed model can be effective for decision making especially in the capital market. Possibility of measuring management moral hazards, the necessary actions can be taken to reduce it through the establishment of strong corporate governance mechanisms for control and supervision.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
ابریشمی، حمید؛ توحیدی نیا، ابوالقاسم؛ خزایی، فاطمه.(1396). بررسی و تبیین مخاطرات اخلاقی و انتخاب نامناسب در بازار سرمایه و نقش اخلاق در کاهش آن، مدیریت مخاطرات محیطی (دانش مخاطرات سابق)، 4(4)، 418-403.
بادآورنهندی، یونس؛ تقی زاده، وحید.(1398). ارائه مدل سنجش کارایی سرمایهگذاری شرکت در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران، تحقیقات مالی، 21 (2)، 264-237.
خلیفه سلطانی، سید احمد؛ خواجوی، سیمین.(1395). تأثیر مخاطرات اخلاقی بر ساختار سرمایه، مطالعات تجربی حسابداری مالی، 13 (49)، 189-171 .
خدارحمی، بهروز؛ فروغ نژاد،حیدر؛ شریفی، محمدجواد؛ طالبی، علیرضا.(1395). تأثیر عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی بر ریسک سقوط آتی قیمت سهام شرکتهای پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران، فصلنامه مدیریت دارایی و تأمین مالی، 4(3)، 58-39.
ستایش، محمد حسین؛ غفاری، محمد جواد؛ رستم زاده، ناصر.(1392)، بررسی تأثیر عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی بر هزینه سرمایه، فصلنامه پژوهشهای تجربی حسابداری، 2 (4)، 146-125
کردستانی، غلامرضا؛ قربانی، رامین؛ خوانساری، نیکو.(1395). بررسی تأثیر نظام راهبری شرکتی بر ارتباط بین جریان نقد آزاد و بازده سهام شرکت، فصلنامه پژوهشهای تجربی حسابداری، 7(26)، 233-213 .
منصورفر، غلامرضا؛ جودی، سمیرا؛ پورسلیمان، احسان.(1399). نقش تعدیلگری ابعاد درونی و بیرونی حاکمیت شرکتی بر رابطه بین عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی و کارایی سرمایهگذاری، تحقیقات مالی، 2 (22)، 248-227.
Abrishami, Hamid. Tohidinia, Abolghasem, Khazaei, Fatima.(2018). Investigating and explaining moral hazards and adverse selection in the capital market and the role of ethics in reducing it. Environmental Risk Management, 4 (4), 403-418. (in Persian)
Aksu, c., Eckstein, W.H. Greene and j. Ronen.(1995). Time-Series properties,Adjustment processes and Forecasting of Financial Ratio's. Journal of AccountingAuditingand Finance, Mar, P. 1-44.
Abor, J. and Godfred, A.(2010). Investment Opportunities, Corporate Finance, and Dividend Payout Policy", Economics and Finance, 27 (3): 180- 194.
BadavarNahandi, Younes. Taghizadeh Khanqah.(2019). Presentation of Firm's Investment Efficiency Measurement Model inTehran Stock Exchange, Financial Research Journal, 21 (2), 264-237. (in Persian)
Berle, A. A., and Means, G. C.(1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property Revised Edition. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Bharath, Sreedhar T. and Pasquariello, Paolo and Wu, Guojun (2006). Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions? EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings; AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper.
Chung, Richard, Firth, Michael and Kim, Jeong-Bon.(2005). Earnings management, surplus free cash flow, and external monitoring. Journal of Business Research, 58, issue 6, p. 766-776.
Guariglia. A, J. Yang.(2016). a balancing act: Managing financial constraints and agency costs to minimize investment inefficiency in the Chinese market. Journal of Corporate Finance 36 (February):111-130.
Himmelberg, C.P., Hubbard, R.G., Palia, D.(1999). Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(53), 353-384
Hart,O. D.(1983). The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell Journal of Economics, 14: 366-382.
Jensen, M.C. and Murphy, K.J.(1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives, Journal of Political Economy, 98: 225-264
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H.(1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
Khalifa Soltani, Seyyed Ahmad. Barzegar, Ghazaleh.(2016). the Relationship of Ethical Risk with Profit Management. Journal of Accounting Knowledge, 7 (24), 90-67
Lee, Jimmy.(2009).Moral Hazard, Firms’ Internal Governance and Management. Polar views of organizational outcomes. Research in Organizational Behavior, 9, 369-406.
Leledakis, George, and Ian R. Davidson.(2001(. Are Two Factors Enough? The UK Evidence. Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 57, no. 6 (November/December): 96105.
Lim, C. Y, Ding, D. K. and Thong, T. Y.(2008). Firm Diversification and Earnings Management: Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, No 30, PP. 69–92.
Marris,R.(1998). Managerial Capitalism in Retrospect. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.
Mirrlees, J.(1999). The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior: Part I, Review of Economic Studies, 66, 3–21.
Martin C. Byford.(2017), Moral Hazard in Strategic Decision Making, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3, 58-79
Matthias Kiefer Edward A.E. Jones Andrew T. Adams.(2017). Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams, Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, 9, Iss 1pp.
Martin C. Byford.(2017). Moral Hazard in Strategic Decision Making, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3, 58-79.
Setayesh, Mohammad Hossein. Ghaffari Mohammad Javad. Rostam Zade, Naser.(2013). Investigating the Impact of Information Asymmetry on Cost of Capital, the Journal of Empirical Researches in Accounting, 2 (4), 146-125. (in Persian)
Saghafi, Ali. Moradi joz, Mohsen. Sohrabi, HosseinAli.(2014). Relationship between Earnings Management and Information Asymmetry in the Condition of Environmental Uncertainty, Journal of Accounting Knowledge, 5 (17), 27-7. (in Persian)
Vilmos F. Misangyi.(2001). A test of alternative theoties of managerial discretion, University of florida.
Wernerfelt, B.(1985). Brand Loyalty and User Skills. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 6, 381-385.
)