شبیه سازی هزینه های نمایندگی در رابطه مدیر- مالک با استفاده از رویکرد پویایی شناسی سیستمی: مورد مطالعه پتروشیمی شیراز

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 ستاد بخش حسابداری دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران

2 استادیار گروه حسابداری دانشکده کسب و کار و اقتصاد دانشگاه خلیج فارس، بوشهر، ایران،

چکیده

هدف این پژوهش ارائه مدل هزینه ­های نمایندگی و شبیه­سازی این هزینه­ها برای شرکت پتروشیمی شیراز در یک دوره 100 ماهه است. به منظور تدوین مدل هزینه­های نمایندگی، ابتدا با روش شناخت تاریخی در چارچوب مطالعات کتابخانه­ ای، به استخراج متغیرها، مکانیسم­ ها و روابط موجود بین آن­ها پرداخته شد. سپس با استفاده از نرم­افزار ونسیم دی­اس­اس مدل کلی و کاربردی در خصوص شبیه­سازی هزینه ­های نمایندگی مدیر- مالک برای شرکت پتروشیمی شیراز ارائه و اجرا گردید. با اجرای مدل تدوین شده، مشخص گردید که هزینه ­های نمایندگی شرکت مورد بررسی در طی 100 ماه پیوسته افزایش خواهد یافت. لذا، جهت کاهش هزینه­ها، سیاست­های متعددی وضع گردید. این سیاست­­ها عبارتند از: اعطای مالکیت سهام (به عنوان پاداش) به مدیر، افزایش بدهی­­ و کارایی هیئت­مدیره. نتایج نشان داد که هر یک از سیاست­های مذکور به تنهایی و به صورت ترکیبی می­تواند به صورت قابل توجهی هزینه­ های نمایندگی را کاهش دهند. معرفی نگرش سیستمی در پژوهش­های حوزه حسابداری به طور ویژه هزینه­ های نمایندگی مدیر-مالک نوآوری این پژوهش است. 

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Simulation of Agency Costs of Manager-Owner Using the System Dynamics Approach: Study of Shiraz Petrochemicals

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammad Hussein Setayesh 1
  • ali ghayouri moghaddam 2
1 Professor of accounting, Shiraz university, Shiraz, Iran
2 Assistant Professor of Accounting, Khalij University, Business and Economics department, Boshehr, Iran
چکیده [English]

The purpose of this study is presentation of an agency cost model and simulation of these costs for Shiraz Petrochemical Company in a 100-month period.  In order to develop an agency cost model, firstly, using the historical recognition method in the framework of library studies, we extract the variables, mechanisms and relations existing between them. Then, a general and practical model is presented to simulate the agency costs of manager-owner for Shiraz Petrochemical Company using the software Vensim DSS. With the implementation of the developed model, it is found that the company's agency costs would increase over a period of 100 months. Therefore, several policies are introduced to reduce costs. These policies include the manager’s ownership of the stock (as a bonus) , an increase in the debt and the board efficiency. The results show that each of these policies, alone and in combination, can significantly reduce the agency costs. Introducing a systemic attitude in the field of accounting research, specifically the agency costs of manager-owner is innovation in this research. 

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Manager-Owner Agency Costs
  • System Dynamics
  • Simulation
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