The Effect of Chief Executive Officer Tenure on Firms Value, Agency Costs and Information Risk

Authors

Abstract

In this study, the relationship between CEO tenure with firm value, agency costs and information risk has been examined. The purpose of this study is that the increase in CEO tenure has significant impact on the value of the company, agency costs and information risk? For this purpose, a sample of ninety-six companies, including the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period from 1380 to 1389 was selected. We devise a measure of expected CEO tenure as a proxy for the length of CEO decision horizon. In view of the CEO's tenure as the independent variable and use two stage least squares regression, Empirical tests show that longer CEO tenure is associated with information risk and firm value. Also, Relationship between tenure as CEO and agency costs are not significant.

Keywords


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