عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]چکیده [English]
According to Agency Theory, managers are going to maximize their interests. Appropriate Corporate Governance Mechanisms can prohibit the opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, Conservatism can be regarded as a Mechanism that reduces Agency Cost. This study has examined the variables effective on conservatism, especially Corporate Governance Mechanisms, based on Substitutive Perspective. In order to measure conservatism, Khan and Watts firm-year model (2007 and 2009) and Basu model (1997) are used. Independent variables are Corporate governance mechanisms including: dual role of a CEO, the percentage of non-executive board members, the percentage of institutional ownership and percentage of shares held by insiders (i.e., managers and directors), and the other effective variables are: company age (the number of years after initial public offering), investment cycle, volatility, and external auditor size . Examination of data from 72 firms in years 1384-1388, indicated that there is a positive relation between conservatism and the percentage of shares held by insiders (i.e., managers and directors) as well as volatility, and a negative relation between conservatism and the percentage of institutional ownership, age of the company, and external auditor size. There was no meaningful relation between conservatism and investment cycle, percentage of nonexecutive board members and dual role of a CEO .