رقابت بازار محصول و حق الزحمه حسابرسی: با تاکید بر نقش حاکمیت شرکتی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار گروه حسابداری دانشکده مدیریت دانشگاه تهران

2 دانشجوی دکتری حسابداری، دانشکده مدیریت و حسابداری، پردیس فارابی دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

هدف این پژوهش، بررسی رابطه بین رقابت بازار محصول و میزان حق الزحمه حسابرسی با در نظر گرفتن نقش حاکمیت شرکتی می‌باشد. در واقع پژوهش حاضر بر آزمون تجربی اثر حاکمیت شرکتی بر رابطه رقابت بازار محصول و میزان حق الزحمه حسابرسی متمرکز شده است. برای طراحی شاخصی که متغیر حاکمیت شرکتی را اندازه گیری کند از روش تاپسیس استفاده شده است. در این شاخص از شش معیار اندازه هیات مدیره، استقلال هیات مدیره، دوگانگی وظایف مدیرعامل، مالکیت نهادی، تمرکز مالکیت و حسابرس مستقل به عنوان ورودی استفاده می‌شود. نمونة پژوهش، شرکتهای پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران و فرابورس ایران بین سال های 1388 تا 1393 است. یافته‌های پژوهش حاکی از آن است که بین رقابت بازار محصول و میزان حق الزحمه حسابرسی رابطه مثبت و معناداری وجود دارد و ساز وکارهای حاکمیت شرکتی، بر این رابطه به صورت معکوس، اثرگذار بوده و از شدت این رابطه می‌کاهند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Corporate Governance And The Relation between Product Market Competition and Audit Fees

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammad Moradi 1
  • fatemeh mohaghegh 2
چکیده [English]

The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between product market competition and the audit fees with regard to the role of corporate governance. Using TOPSIS, a ranking index of companies was made based on corporate governance. The index included six factors: board of director size, board independence, CEO duality tasks, institutional ownership, ownership concentration and independent auditors. The test research hypotheses, multivariate regression analysis and panel data approach with fixed effects is used. Sample includes firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) and Iran Fara Bourse (IFB) market during 2009 to 2014. Findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between product market competition and audit fees and corporate governance mechanisms have the reverse effect on this relation and reduce the strength of this relationship. This means that in competitive environment, business risk is high and so, audit risk and audit fee are increased. However, if client has appropriate corporate governance mechanisms, increase in the audit fee is less.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Product Market Competition
  • Audit Fees
  • Corporate Governance

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